This study investigates whether board interlocks, created when a director sits on the boards of two different firms, serve as a channel for the spread of earnings management behaviors. The abnormal accruals model proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) is used to measure the extent of earnings management, and the three-year diffusion period design suggested by Chiu et al. (2013) is applied to analyze the impact of board interlocks on earnings management behaviors. Furthermore, this study investigates whether the phenomenon of earnings management behaviors spreading via board interlocks differs when independent directors are involved in the interlocks. The empirical results indicate that there is a contagion effect for both high and low levels of earnings management through board interlocks. Additionally, this study shows that when independent directors are involved in board interlocks with firms exhibiting either high or low levels of earnings management behaviors, the level of earnings management decreases. This finding shows the effectiveness of independent directors in curbing earnings management when they are part of board interlocks.