We examine the effect of share pledging by insiders (i.e., directors and executives) on non-GAAP reporting. Using a hand-collected sample of publicly listed US firms over the 2006 to 2019 period, we find that share pledging is positively associated with the likelihood of non-GAAP reporting and negatively related to the quality of non-GAAP reporting. The results are robust to (1) employing alternative measures of non-GAAP reporting quality, (2) controlling for earnings management, (3) using an entropy balanced sample, and (4) conducting a difference-in-differences analysis using pledging initiations. Additional analyses reveal that the effect of share pledging on the likelihood and quality of non-GAAP reporting is more pronounced among firms that have lower analyst coverage and less independent board. Overall, our results suggest that firms that have insiders who have shares under pledge report non-GAAP earnings aggressively.